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ALTIERI, CHARLES. Reckoning with the Imagination: Wittgenstein and the Aesthetics of  
Literary Experience. Cornell University Press, 2015, xii + 262 pp.,  $79.95 cloth, $28.95 
paper. 
 
 
Charles Altieri is among a small handful of our most distinguished and insightful readers of 
English-language modernist poetry, from his 1984 Self and Sensibility in Contemporary 
American Poetry to his 1989 Painterly Abstraction in Modernist American Poetry and 2005 The 
Art of Modern American Poetry. His only competitors as a reader of modernist texts are Helen 
Vendler, Marjorie Perloff, and poet-scholars such as Charles Bernstein and Susan Stewart. At the 
same time, Altieri has produced a series of philosophically oriented books in which he has 
reflected on both modernist poetry and his own procedures and commitments as a reader, 
including Act and Quality (1981), Canons and Consequences (1990), Subjective Agency (1994), 
and The Particulars of Rapture (2003). In both his critical readings and his more theoretical 
work, Altieri’s primary focus has continually been on how subjective agency can productively 
develop itself both through writing poetry and through reading it. His new book extends and 
deepens his theoretical reflections, thus forming a kind of capstone to his career. 
Given the intellectual fashions of the past forty or so years in literary studies, Altieri’s 
central project of characterizing the productive values both of modernist poetry and of the close 
reading of it has won him enemies of various kinds. Chief among these are various kinds of 
instrumentalist reading, either moralizing or reductionist social explanation-seeking, and 
deconstructionist reading that seeks and finds only absolute and uncontentful singularities of 
language-in-play. Contemporary criticism in general, Altieri observes, has lost “sight of almost 
anything connected to imagination and imaginative power, except perhaps its capacity to 
generate escapist fantasy” (p. 63). In contrast with alternative, imagination-scanting protocols of 
reading, Altieri’s watchwords are attention, focus, sympathy, and appreciation. Or as he puts it 
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here, “we are not done with the maker” (p. 8), and we would do well in reading to focus on the 
“distinctive powers of subjects to construct values and live in accord with them” (p. 11) as those 
powers are put on display in works of literature, preeminently in poetry. A poem “realizes 
aspects of the self,” and readers should “try to participate in how texts engage our affective 
lives” (p. 12). Here Altieri’s emphasis on the processual, subjectivity-developing aspect of the 
literary work and on readerly participation in it enables him to sidestep or recast tired debates 
about literary cognitivism and literary moralism as well as binary oppositions between purveyed 
doctrine and textual free play, since imaginative participation in the agency at work in the 
literary text is foregrounded over single-sentence conclusions. As Martha Nussbaum once put it, 
adapting a phrase from Henry James, we are as readers to become “participators by a fond 
attention” (Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 162) in the 
work of the construction of subjectivity that is done in and through the literary work. 
In contrast with Nussbaum, however, Altieri strongly emphasizes the socially situated 
characters of the labors of both writing and reading. A sense of the display or exemplification of 
a subject’s self-enactments in the work, drawn from Wittgenstein and Goodman, is balanced 
with a sense of subject identity as a socially enabled social status, drawn from Hegel.  Whatever 
the importance of a distinct human body in establishing the numerical identity of any human 
being, and whatever the importance of standing human powers and interests, no one becomes an 
accomplished discursive subject without taking on, while also potentially revising, a language 
and a large body of commitments––epistemic, political, ethical, artistic, and so on––that are in 
social circulation. 
Altieri’s distinct modernist spin on this Hegelian thought is then to suggest that we tend 
as subjects to live too conventionally, palely, and under the sways of social routines that we fail 
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to embrace fully and with animated interest. Poetic art offers us a route toward re-animation, as 
its enactments of itineraries of developing interest can intensify and clarify experience and open 
up routes of fuller cathexis to it. “Most significant works of art promise only to mobilize and 
thicken experience so that the world becomes a more vital place for habitation, making the self 
feel itself an adequate locus of responsiveness to what the world can offer” (p. 106). (Here 
Altieri is close to Richard Eldridge’s account of poetry’s work as clarification and movement 
from passively suffered to actively engaged feeling in Literature, Life, and Modernity [New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2008]).  
Altieri’s emphasis on how a work of literary art can mobilize and thicken experience via 
the reader’s imaginative participation in it enables him to “avoid ethics entirely” (p. 161), no 
matter whether in its deconstructionist, Levinas-inspired, absolute otherness-embracing form or 
in the guise of an ethical criticism that seeks propositional moral knowledge, as Altieri charges 
Alice Crary does. In place of more or less generalization-seeking knowing as accomplished 
either by the work or by the reader, Altieri stresses valuing.  Both as enacted and expressed in the 
literary work and as shared in imaginatively by its reader, valuing is a matter of “how the self 
can attune to what is at stake in imagined situations” (pp. 180-81) in the interest of being open to 
“the person the self becomes by virtue of how he or she engages with an object” (p. 181)––either 
an object of imaginative attention for a literary writer or the work itself for its reader. 
In a kind of argumentative coda, Altieri concludes by mounting a case for a criticism of 
appreciation rather than a criticism of resentment. Here he is close to the recent efforts of Ted 
Cohen (Thinking of Others: On the Talent for Metaphor [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2012) and Rita Felski (Uses of Literature [Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008]; The Limits of 
Critique [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015]) to challenge a hermeneutics of suspicion. 
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Appreciation in the sense in which Altieri defends it should not be understood as involving 
connoisseurship, middlebrow art history light, or the mindless tolerance of cultural difference. 
Instead it is a name for “how we respond to expressive activities of all kinds” (p. 196) in both art 
and life and for the valuing we do or can do within attentive, imaginative reading. Valuing can 
lead to “a self-aware quickening” (p. 199)––Kantian Belebung––that it is one of the central 
powers and offices of art to provide. Imaginative engagement in the literary work’s affordances 
of possibilities of animation fuses responsiveness to aesthetic-formal, expressive-attitudinal, 
semantic-representational, and political-historical-cultural features of the work, features which 
are not properly sharply separable from one another. “The supreme fiction of literary criticism 
ought to be that by cultivating appreciation it can provide a counterweight to two forms of 
deadness that pervade contemporary life––our failures to recognize what might be significantly 
meaningful for us and our refusals to recognize the immense blindnesses caused by our 
resentments” (p. 196). 
Overall, Reckoning with the Imagination is addressed in the first instance to literary 
scholars and their current, even recurrent, methodological plights. Unlike literary scholars, for 
whom New Criticism, deconstruction, and New Historicism, among others, have been successive 
and competing hegemonic methods, philosophers of art have been on the whole less inclined to 
separate artistic forms from artistic meanings, or aesthetic, expressive, semantic, and historical 
features from one another. Yet Altieri’s work also functions as a powerful reminder to 
philosophers of just how thoroughly interfused with one another these features are.  
Some sentences can be a bit prolix, and there are occasional mistakes in the discussions 
of philosophers––for example, ascribing to Nelson Goodman the view that “we sort properties, 
not acts” (p. 139). There is a howler of a typo repeated three times on pp. 202-3. These are, 
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however, minor annoyances, and it would be unfortunate if either philosophers or literary 
scholars were significantly put off by them. Altieri’s overall description of the powers and 
offices of literary art (and its criticism) is compelling. Moreover, this case is developed not only 
by way of general accounts of imagination, expression, display, and valuing, but also by brief 
close readings of how a number of major poets imagine, express, display, and value in particular 
works. Chief among these are W. B. Yeats, Marianne Moore, John Ashbery, and Dodie Bellamy, 
with briefer appearances by Shakespeare, Blake, W. C. Williams, and Jean Toomer, among 
others. Altieri’s reading of Ashbery’s “The Instruction Manual” is a tour de force that puts flesh 
on the bones of the general view in a way that can be matched by very few, if any, critics or 
philosophers.  
It would require significant, difficult shifts in current habits of both attention and interest 
on the part of both literary criticism and the philosophy of art for Altieri’s plaidoyer for 
appreciation and imaginative engagement to be taken up.  Literary scholars would have to 
abandon substantially an often all too knowing, value-skeptical and politically tendentious stance 
toward the literary work as mere social historical object. Philosophers would have to wean 
themselves to some extent from generalization-seeking theorizing about cognitivisms and 
moralisms, and they would have to learn to read works of literature and imaginative criticism as 
themselves forms of serious figural thinking about human life and values. Both camps, along 
with cultural life as a whole, would be well served by taking up the supreme fiction that Altieri 
puts forward. 
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